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ONLINE APPENDIX
A Instruction for the Unanimity Chat
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple, and
if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you may earn a CONSIDERABLE
AMOUNT OF MONEY which will be PAID TO YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment.
The currency in this experiment is called tokens. All payoffs are denominated in this currency.
The total amount of tokens you earn in the experiment will be converted into US dollars using
the rate 50 Tokens = $1. In addition, you will get a $5 participation fee if you complete the
experiment.
In this experiment you will act as voters. You will distribute funds between yourself and others
in a series of Periods. In each Period you will be randomly divided into groups of 5 members
each. Each group will decide how to split a sum of money. Proposals will be voted up or
down (accepted or rejected) by unanimity rule. That is, if 5 out 5 voters approve a proposal,
it passes. In any Period you will not know the identity of the subjects you are matched with
and your group-members will not know your identity. In each Period you will have to decide
how to divide 250 tokens among the 5 voters in your group. One of the 5 voters in your group
will be randomly chosen to make a proposal of how to split 250 tokens among the 5 voters
(provisional budget proposal). Each voter has the same chance of being selected to make a
proposal. Allocations to each member must be between 0 and 250 tokens. All allocations must
add up to 250 tokens. After the selected proposer has made his/her allocation, this proposal
will be posted on your computer screens with the proposed allocation to you and the other
voters clearly indicated. You will then have to decide whether to accept or reject the proposed
allocation.
If the proposal passes (gets all 5 votes), the proposed allocation is implemented and we will
move on to the next Period. If the proposal is defeated (gets fewer than 5 votes), there will be a
call for new proposals and the process will repeat itself. However, the amount of money to be
divided will be reduced by 20% of the amount of money in the preceding Round and rounded
to the nearest integer. Thus, if the proposal in Round 1 is rejected, the new proposal in Round
2 will involve splitting 200 tokens among the 5 voters. And if this new proposal is rejected in
Round 2, then in round 3 you will be splitting 160 tokens. If the proposal in rejected in Round
3, then in Round 4 you will be splitting 128 tokens, etc? This process will repeat itself until a
proposed allocation is passed (gets all 5 votes).
To summarize, the steps of the process will work as follows:
1. One voter is randomly selected to make a proposal of how to split 250 tokens.
2. A vote is held (each member of the group votes to accept or reject the proposal of the
selected voter).
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3. If all 5 voters accept it, then the proposal passes and the Period is over. If the proposal is
rejected, then the money shrinks by 20%, we move on to the next Round of this Period
and a new voter is chosen to propose the split (each of the 5 voters in a group has equal
chance of being chosen). The process repeats itself until the proposal of the selected
voter for that Round passes.
At the start of each Period, you will be randomly re-matched into groups of 5 voters each. Each
member of the group is assigned an ID number (from 1 to 5), which is displayed on the top of
the screen. Once the Period is over, you will be randomly re-matched to form new groups of 5
voters each and you will be assigned a (potentially) NEW ID. Please make sure you know your
ID number when making your decisions. Since ID numbers will be randomly assigned prior
to the start of each Period, all voters are likely to have their ID numbers vary between Periods,
and, thus, it is impossible to identify subjects using their ID numbers.
In each round, after one voter is selected to propose a split but before he/she submits his/her
proposal, members of a group will have the opportunity to communicate with each other using
the chat box. The communication is structured as follows. On the top of the screen, each
member of the group will be told her ID number. You will also know the ID number of the
voter who is currently selected to make a proposal. Below you will see a box, in which you
will see all messages sent to either all members of your group or to you personally. You will
not see the chat messages that are sent privately to other members. In the box below that one,
you can type your own message and send it either to the entire group or to particular members
of the group. To select subjects that will receive your message, simply click on the buttons that
correspond to the ID numbers of the subjects you wish to send this message to and hit SEND.
You can send a message to all members of your group by clicking the SELECT ALL button.
The chat option will be available until the voter selected to make a proposal submits her pro-
posal. At this moment the chat option will be disabled.
Remember that in each Period subjects are randomly matched into groups and ID numbers
of the group-members are randomly assigned. Thus, your ID number is likely to vary from
Period to Period, and, therefore, it is impossible to identify your group-members using your ID
number.
At the conclusion of the experiment we will sum up all the tokens you earned in the experiment
and convert this amount into US dollars using the conversion rate 50 tokens = $1. In addition,
you will receive a $5 participation fee for completing the experiment.
You are not to reveal your (potential) earnings, nor are you to speak or communicate in any
other way with any other subject while the experiment is in progress. This is important to the
validity of the study and will be not tolerated.
We will now go slowly through one practice Period to familiarize you with the screen. After
the practice Period is over, we will start the experiment, in which you will play 15 Periods for
cash.
Review. Let’s summarize the main points:
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1. The experiment will consist of 15 Periods. There may be several Rounds in each Period.
2. Prior to each Period, you will be randomly divided into groups of 5 voters each. Each
subject in a group will be assigned an ID number.
3. At the start of each Period, one subject in your group will be randomly selected to propose
a split of 250 tokens between the five of you. Before he/she submits his/her proposal,
members of the group can use the chat box to communicate with each other. You may
send public messages that will be delivered to all members of your group as well private
messages that will be delivered to members that you specify explicitly.
4. Proposals to each voter must be greater than or equal to 0 tokens.
5. If all 5 voters accept the proposal, the Period ends.
6. If one or more voters reject the proposal then a (potentially) new voter will be randomly
selected to make a proposal in the next Round of that Period.
7. The amount of money to be divided shrinks by 20% following each rejection of a proposal
in a given Period.
Are there any questions?
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B Analysis of Chat Protocols
Below we list the various variables, together with a short explanation, that the coders used in
interpreting subjects’ statements.
1. “Ask Amount.” This is the explicit amount that a non-proposer is requesting. You can
also record here an amount that someone says he will accept in exchange for a vote.
2. “Own Vague.” Responder just asking for tokens (unspecified amount).
3. “Ask Equal.” Responder asking for equality.
4. “Social Vague.” Responder asking proposer to be nice or fair or something like that.
5. “Responding.” This is equal to 1 if this statement is in response to a question on type
of split by the proposer. This is accompanied by a 1 in either AskAmount, OwnVauge,
AskEqual or SocialVague.
6. “Proposer Direct.” Dummy indicating that the proposer is trying to figure out how much
someone wants.
7. “Proposer Own.” Proposer is indicating that he/she will get a higher share than at least
some others.
8. “Proposer Equal.” Proposer is indicating that he/she intends to split equally.
9. “Unsure.” Dont know where to put a 1 but could fit in one of these categories.
10. “Relevant.” Anything you cant categorize but thats relevant: discussions about rules,
anything that is related to the game.
C Additional Data Analysis
C.1 Efficiency
In Table 7 we present the 95% confidence intervals for the efficiency measures reported in Table
1 in the main text of the paper, where observations are clustered at the session level to account
for the interdependencies of observations that come from the same session.
As we discuss in Section 4.1.2, there is no statistical differences between treatments in all
three efficiency measures (probability of delays, number of bargaining stages, and the propor-
tion of initial pie realized) in the very first game our subjects play. However, as subjects gain
more experience with the game, the stark differences emerge. The most notable ones are the
lower probability of delays occurring in the Chat compared with Baseline treatment, which
results in the higher proportion of initial pie realized in the Chat than in the Baseline treatment.
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Table 7: Efficiency and Delays (95% confidence intervals)
Unanimity Baseline Unanimity Chat
game 1 last 5 games game 1 last 5 games
Probability of Delays (−0.22, 0.34) (0.27, 0.60) (−0.16, 0.43) (0.05, 0.19)
Number of Bargaining Stages (0.51, 1.82) (−1.61, 7.89) (0.89, 1.35) (0.96, 1.17)
Proportion of Initial Pie Realized (0.88, 1.08) (0.82, 0.89) (0.91, 1.03) (0.96, 1.01)
Remarks: We report the 95% confidence intervals of probability of delays which measures the likelihood that the
first stage proposal was rejected, the number of bargaining stages and the proportion of initial pie realized, where
the observations are clustered at the session level.
C.2 Proposed Budgets and Final Allocations
In Table 8 we report the 95% confidence intervals of first-stage submitted, passed and rejected
proposals as well as the final allocations. Results reported in this table confirm what we report
in Section 4.1.3. In particular, focusing on the proposals submitted in the last 5 games, we
observe that in committees that do not have access to communication between members, pro-
posers tend to appropriate a higher share of resources than coalition partners. At the same time,
proposer under-exploit their power relative to the equilibrium predictions, according to which
a proposer should appropriate 90 tokens. However, once committee members can chat with
each other, we observe no differences between proposers’ and non-proposers’ shares. Final
allocations display similar patterns, i.e., the availability of communication removes proposers’
power all together.
C.3 Results over time
In this section, we replicate the main analysis of the data breaking all 15 bargaining games
played within each experimental session into three time periods: the first five bargaining games,
the second five bargaining games, and the last five bargaining games. The goal of this section
is to document learning behavior of subjects as they gain experience with the game over the
course of the experiment.
Table 9 depicts three measures of efficiency: the probability of observing delays in reaching
agreements, the average number of bargaining stages prior to the agreements, and the percent-
age of pie that subjects realized as a result of the bargaining. All three efficiency measures
are quite stable across the three time periods in both Unanimity Baseline and Unanimity Chat
treatments. Indeed, delays are very likely and happen more than 30% of the time right from the
beginning of the experiment in the Unanimity Baseline treatment, reaching 44% in the last five
bargaining games. These delays are costly, since the budget available for division shrinks as
subjects take longer to reach agreement. On the contrary, subjects learn to avoid costly delays
when they communicate with each other in the Unanimity Chat treatment. While in the first 5
bargaining games delays happen 13% of the time, by the end of the experiment, the fraction of
delays is not significantly different from theoretically predicted 0%. As a result of this learning,
by the end of the experiment, subjects in the Unanimity Chat treatment appropriate more than
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Table 8: First-stage Proposals and Final Allocations (95% confidence intervals)
Baseline Chat
game 1 last 5 games game 1 last 5 games
FIRST STAGE
Submitted Proposals
Proposer’s Share (46.8, 68.0) (60.7, 75.6) (49.5, 58.8) (49.9, 51.7)
Max Non-proposer’s Share (40.1, 52.2) (44.6, 47.3) (47.7, 50.3) (49.6, 50.1)
Passed Proposals
Proposer’s Share (57.9, 61.3) (51.4, 76.3) (47.7, 53.9) (49.7, 50.7)
Max Non-proposer’s Share (47.2, 48.0) (43.4, 49.6) (49.2, 50.5) (49.9, 50.1)
Rejected Proposals (for n > 2)
Proposer’s Share n/a (68.3, 79.1) n/a (52.5, 65.9)
Max Non-proposer’s Share n/a (44.4, 46.0) n/a (46.5, 49.5)
FINAL ALLOCATIONS
Proposer’s Share (51.9, 64.9) (40.0, 64.2) (43.6, 55.1) (48.0, 51.0)
Max Non-proposer’s Share (41.8, 51.2) (39.2, 41.3) (46.1, 50.9) (48.2, 50.5)
Remarks: We report the 95% confidence intervals for share of the proposer and the highest share among coalition
partners in tokens, where observations are clustered at the session level. “n/a” indicates that there are fewer than
3 observations in the category.
99% of the budget. This learning takes time, however, as in the first five bargaining games
subjects appropriate significantly less than 100% of available resources (97% to be exact).
Table 10 reports shares of the proposers and coalition partners in each time period in first-
stage proposals as well as in the final allocations agreed upon. All main comparisons between
treatments documented in the last 5 bargaining games hold true both in the first 5 bargaining
games and in the second 5 bargaining games. Specifically, looking at the first-stage submitted
proposals, we note that proposers request a higher share of resources in the Unanimity Baseline
treatment compared with the Unanimity Chat treatment right from the start of the experiment.
Indeed, in the first 5 bargaining games, shares requested by the proposers are higher in the
Unanimity Baseline than in the Unanimity Chat treatment (p = 0.001). Furthermore, there are
significantly more equal split coalition proposals in the Unanimity Chat treatment compared
with the Unanimity Baseline treatment starting from the very first 5 bargaining games (p <
0.001). Both these patterns continue to hold throughout the experiment and remain intact not
only for the first-stage submitted proposals but also for the final allocations. 23 Just like in the
last 5 bargaining games, rejected proposals in the first 5 bargaining games feature significantly
23Considering all final allocations, we note that proposers’ shares are significantly higher in the Unanimity
Baseline treatment compared with the Unanimity Chat treatment in the first 5 bargaining games (p = 0.003).
Moreover, final allocations are much more likely to be exact equal splits in the Unanimity Chat treatment than in
the Unanimity Baseline treatment in the first 5 bargaining games (p < 0.001).
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Table 9: Efficiency and Delays
Unanimity Baseline
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
Probability of Delays 0.33∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.39∗∗∗(0.01) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.07)
Nb of Bargaining Stages 1.45 (0.03) 3.34 (1.46) 3.14 (1.10)
% Pie Realized 0.91∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.89∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.85∗∗∗ (0.01)
Unanimity Chat
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
Probability. of Delays 0.13∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.16∗(0.04) 0.07 (0.03)
Nb. of Bargaining Stages 1.12 (0.01) 1.16 (0.04) 1.06 (0.03)
% Pie Realized 0.97∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.97∗ (0.01) 0.99 (0.01)
Remarks: Probability of delays measures the likelihood that the first stage proposal was rejected. Number of bar-
gaining stages and Proportion of initial pie realized report the average quantities across sessions and cluster-robust
standard errors are in parentheses, where the observations are clustered at the session level. For the probability
of delays and the proportion of initial pie realized we also report whether the observed quantity is significantly
different from the theoretically predicted one with ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicating significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels,
respectively.
higher proposer shares than passed proposals (p = 0.035 in the Unanimity Baseline treatment,
and p = 0.079 in the Unanimity Chat treatment).
Table 11 reports the breakdown of group-level conversations into three categories: relevant
conversations (those that contain some discussion about the game, players’ strategies, and/or
payoffs), irrelevant conversations, and groups that refrained from talking in the three time peri-
ods defined above. Right from the beginning of the experiment, subjects mostly discuss things
that are relevant to the game. Irrelevant conversations are quite rare both at the beginning of
experimental sessions and at the end. There is some non-negligible fraction of groups that do
not communicate with each other: this fraction starts at 7% in the first 5 bargaining games and
reaches 16% by the end of the experiment in the last 5 bargaining games.
Table 12 depicts the frequency and content of individual messages sent by proposers and
non-proposers in the Unanimity Chat treatment in each time period. The analysis of content of
individual messages throughout the experiment reveals that subjects use the chats throughout
the session in a consistent manner. Specifically, the main features of chat protocols are the
same in each time period of the experiment: (a) most subjects send public messages that are
delivered to the entire group throughout the session; (b) private messages are rare both at the
beginning of the experiment and at the end; (c) public messages are used mostly to lobby for
fairness and equality rather than lobby for one’s own interests.
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Table 10: First-stage Proposals and Final Allocations
Baseline Chat
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15 games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
FIRST STAGE
Submitted Proposals
Proposer’s Share 67.9 (2.33) 68.25 (2.60) 68.2 (1.72) 52.9 (0.74) 51.0 (0.52) 50.8 (0.21)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 45.4 (0.55) 45.5 (0.63) 46.0 (0.32) 49.3 (0.18) 49.8 (0.11) 49.9 (0.06)
Fraction of Equal Splits 21.3% 23.8 7.5% 85.3% 78.7% 88.0%
Passed Proposals
Proposer’s Share 61.4 (1.44) 62.2 (3.60) 63.9 (2.9) 50.2 (0.15) 50.1 (0.07) 50.2 (0.12)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 47.2 (0.38) 47.0 (0.89) 46.5 (0.72) 50.0 (0.03) 50.0 (0.03) 50.0 (0.02)
Fraction of Equal Splits 31.5% 38.8% 13.3% 98.46% 93.7% 94.3%
Rejected Proposals
(for n > 2)
Proposer’s Share 81.5 (5.18) 77.80 (1.23) 73.7 (1.25) 70.4 (5.86) 55.8 (4.85) 59.2 (1.56)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 41.5 (1.20) 43.1 (0.58) 45.2 (0.18) 44.8 (1.37) 48.7 (1.15) 48.0 (0.35)
Fraction of Equal Splits 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
FINAL ALLOCATIONS
Proposer’s Share 55.1 (1.26) 55.0 (2.09) 52.1 (2.81) 48.8 (0.20) 47.9 (0.95) 49.5 (0.35)
Max Non-proposer’s Share 43.2 (0.34) 42.1 (1.06) 40.3 (0.24) 48.7 (0.06) 48.4 (0.36) 49.3 (0.27)
Fraction of Equal Splits 36.3% 35.9% 28.8% 98.7% 93.3% 94.7%
Remarks: We report the average share of the proposer and the highest share among coalition partners in tokens
together with robust standard errors in parentheses, where observations are clustered at the session level. In Equal
Split allocations all members of the committee receive the exact same number of tokens (in the first stage proposals
this is exactly 50 tokens).
Table 11: Frequency of Group-level Conversations in the First Bargaining Stage of Unanimity Chat
treatment.
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
relevant irrelevant no chat relevant irrelevant no chat relevant irrelevant no chat
Conversation 89% 4% 7% 77% 4% 19% 79% 5% 16%
(n = 67) (n = 3) (n = 5) (n=58) (n=3) (n=14) (n = 59) (n = 4) (n = 12)
Chat Duration
in sections 62.2 28.0 n/a 54.0 19.9 n/a 55.8 29.8 n/a
Notes: Relevant conversations are defined as conversations that contain any mention of the game being played.
We use a conservative measure of relevance and label conversation as relevant only if both coders marked it as
relevant.
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Table 12: Frequency and content of individual messages in Unanimity Chat treatment
games 1-5 games 6-10 games 11-15
Non-Proposer Proposer Non-Proposer Proposer Non-Proposer Proposer
Total subjects 75 46 75 50 75 54
Nb (%) subj. relevant chats 66(88.0%)
18
(39.2%)
65
(86.7%)
15
(30.0%)
61
(81.3%)
25
(46.3%)
Public Messages
% send public messages 98.5% 100.0% 96.9% 93.3% 96.7% 96.0%
% lobby fairness 87.7% 83.3% 79.4% 57.1% 75.6% 58.3%
% lobby for self 6.2% 27.8% 11.1% 42.9% 8.5% 29.2%
% exclusively public 98.5% 94.4% 84.6% 73.3% 90.2% 96.0%
Private Messagesa
% send private messages 1.5% 5.6% 15.4% 26.7% 9.8% 4.0%∗
% exclusively private messages 1.5% 0.0% 3.08% 6.7% 4.0% 4.2%∗
aWe generally have few observations here, so we do not present the fraction of subjects who lobby for
fairness or themselves
Notes: The content analysis pertains to those subjects who have sent at least one relevant message in the first stage
of the first, middle or last five games.
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